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In a lecture delivered at Illinois Wesleyan University three years ago, Gro Harlem
Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway and Director-General of the World Health
Organization, observed that Americans who maintain that “Washington is the problem,” and
Europeans who assert that “Brussels is the problem,” are essentially making the same argument.
Since the global financial crisis of the late 2000’s, many discussions of economic policy around
the world have centered around the rise of “populist” sentiments. Examples of these
developments would include the “Brexit” process in the United Kingdom, the “America First”
agenda of the Trump Administration in the United States, and the relative success of
“Euroskeptic” parties, at both ends of the ideological spectrum, in last year’s elections for the
European Parliament. In these (and other) situations, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas and Marat Shterin
(2019, p. 177) have commented that “religion seems to have played a significant role, yet is often
overlooked.”
The initial purpose of this paper is to explore the economic manifestations of the shift
towards populism and nationalism in the United States and parts of Europe, examining their
similarities as well as their differences. Drawing upon survey data and statistical results that
have been presented in recent journal articles, there will also be a consideration of the alternative
responses of various Christian bodies, to these developments, on both continents, as well as the
possible rationale(s) for these differences. This paper will conclude with an argument in favor of
the continued relevance of the legacy of “Christian internationalism” to contemporary questions
of global political economy.
Jan-Werner Muller (2016, pp. 19-20) has described populism as “a particular moralistic
imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and
fully unified . . . people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally
inferior.” While agreeing with this definition, Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig (2019, p. 128)
have also maintained that “the populists are quite heterogeneous in their policy proposals,” with

“economic recipes (that) range from extreme-left pro-redistribution platforms to rather
conservative ones.” It is the latter group, according to Colantone and Stanig, which has also
embraced “economic nationalism, which they specify as an agenda which “combines
conservative economic proposals with nationalist stances on international trade and cooperation,
as well as on immigration.” Contemporary examples of these platforms, in operation, can be
found on both sides of the Atlantic. In a February 13th debate on the future of the European
Union (EU) that was sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, both participants
were asked for their judgment on the intended meaning of the slogan – “Take back control” –
that was adopted by the “Leave” campaign during the 2016 referendum on the United
Kingdom’s membership in the EU. James Kirchick, of the Brookings Institution, offered the
opinion that it referred specifically to immigration policy. Anu Bradford, of the Columbia
University Law School, replied by suggesting that it meant regulatory sovereignty in a broader
sense. (Author’s notes). Both conclusions, however, are consistent with different aspects of the
aforementioned paradigm of economic nationalism. In the United States, defenders of the
Trump Administration’s policies have used the adjective of “free market nationalism” (which
would have been an oxymoron to an earlier generation of conservatives who regarded
themselves as “classical liberals”) to describe the combination of internal tax and regulatory
reduction with external skepticism, at best, towards the benefits of international trade,
immigration, and multilateral institutions. By contrast, in the western portion of continental
Europe, Colantone and Stanig (2019, p. 130) have observed that “the three (with the addition of
isolationism) key elements of economic nationalism are expressed with different nuances, and
mixed in various degrees by different parties,” which span the ideological spectrum. Christel
Lamere Ngnambi (in Kerr, ed., 2019, p. 51) has commented on this diversity by stating that
“while so-called right-wing (emphasis in the original) populisms have emerged more strongly in
Europe in recent decades, they have lost their exclusive place in recent years and are competing

with conquering left-wing populisms . . . whose audiences and favourite themes often overlap
with those of right-wing versions of populism.” This explanation helps to explain the conclusion
of Colantone and Stanig (2019, p. 134), based on their examination of the electoral results in 15
western European nations over 30 years, that “the economic factors behind their success (the
populist and antiestablishment parties) also seem to be rather diverse.”
As Colantone and Stanig (2019, p. 145) have pointed out, many observers have stressed
the importance of cultural factors, in addition to economic forces, as key elements in the overall
explanation of the rise in populist and nationalist sentiments in a number of countries. At the
same time, a great deal of polling data has suggested that there is substantial support, among
certain segments of the Christian community, for these movements. For example, a number of
examinations of public opinion in the United States, especially in the wake of the 2016
Presidential election, has confirmed a high level of popularity, among self-identified
evangelicals, for the Trump Administration. In Europe, the February 17th edition of the Weekly
Word commentary (http://www.weeklyword.eu/) profiled Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orban, one of the leading figures of the “Euroskeptic right” who also describes himself as a
champion and defender of Christianity. The question at hand is as follows: Does contemporary
Christian enthusiasm for populist and nationalist causes include the economic portion of that
agenda, or are certain groups of believers “going along for the ride,” so to speak, because of their
views on cultural matters? In the United States, this question has been investigated by James
Guth. Analyzing data from the 2016 American National Election Study, Guth concluded (2019,
p. 29) that “despite the massive attention given to opposition to free trade as a populism marker,
religious differences are relatively modest and explain little variance. We see only a shadow of
the usual pattern, with Evangelicals (capitalized in the original) and biblical literalists more
skeptical of free trade (at the 0.001 level of statistical significance), and several other
ethnoreligious groups more favorable.”

Similar inquiries have been explored by Greg Smith and Linda Woodhead, with respect
to the 2016 “Brexit” referendum in the United Kingdom. Their conclusion, based on survey
research that was conducted right before this vote was taken, was that self-identified
evangelicals, in England, were less likely to support the “Leave” position in the referendum than
those who described themselves as members of the Church of England, taking into account that
there is some overlap between the two groups. (2018, pp. 209-212; Anglican evangelicals were
also more likely than Anglicans, in general, to support the “Remain” position.) Smith and
Woodhead attribute this difference to the observation (2018, p. 211-212) that English
evangelicals “appear to be considerably more internationalist than Anglicans in their outlook,
which is remarkable given their age profile,” meaning that they lean towards the older end of the
age spectrum: a group of voters who were more likely to support the Leave position, according
to Thomas Sampson (2017, p. 176), who also maintains that the primary motivating factors for
“Leave” voters were non-economic in nature; in other words, they voted for “Brexit” in spite of
the net economic advantages associated with Britain’s membership in the European Union.
(2017, pp. 178-179). Sampson goes on to observe that “in this sense, support for Brexit is a
distinct phenomenon from opposition to trade with China among manufacturing workers in the
United States.” Having said that, the question still “remains” (no pun intended) with respect to
why American evangelicals were more favorably disposed to support a certain kind of “populist”
economic agenda than British (or, at least, English) evangelicals. After considering a potential
explanation that is primarily based on an assessment of economic self-interest, Smith and
Woodhead (2018, p. 214) opt for an alternative view that is rooted in “historical differences
between evangelicals in the two countries” on the basis of several factors: socio-economic
status, ethnic composition, and political affiliations. In particular, they argue that “for a variety
of reasons . . . the culture and ethos of English evangelicalism is more ecumenical and
internationalist.”

In continental Europe, the relationship between different Christian traditions, and the
economic manifestations of populist thought, is more difficult to discern. Employing a
gardening metaphor, Christel Lamere Ngnambi (in Kerr, ed., pp. 75-76) has asserted that
“left-wing populism can grow on a Christian (emphasis in the original) trellis. But when it
comes to Europe, the advantage created by using Christian references in party discourse
undoubtedly belongs to right-wing populism.” Ngnambi explains this divergence by concluding
that the former is more closely identified with a “socialist” (or social democratic) approach to
economic issues, while the latter is “with nativism or related ideologies” that are fundamentally
cultural in nature, even though these views may have economic implications in a manner that is
similar, for example, to the controversies over immigration in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. It should also be noted that alternative representations of Christianity in
Europe have long-standing differences in their collective levels of enthusiasm for the “European
project” of deepening integration, on economic (and other) issues, that is represented by the
institutions and policies of the European Union. Brent Nelsen and James Guth (2015, p. 341)
have argued that while “the Catholic-majority states and the mixed states of Germany and the
Netherlands – certainly most of the elites, and larger swaths of their populations – have adopted
a vision of an ‘ever-closer union’ . . . the Protestant-majority countries, both inside and outside
the EU (the latter sub-group now including the United Kingdom), simply do not accept the
federalist assumption” which underlies this vision.
So how does one interpret all of this information, especially as it relates to the “going
along for the ride” question that was posed earlier in this paper? More precisely, how should one
read “the signs of the times,” with respect to these developments? Starting with the first
question, here are three preliminary thoughts regarding general patterns:
1) Economic nationalists are more united in their views on transnational economic policy
issues, such as trade, than on purely domestic questions, like redistributive policies.

2) Within the “populist” camp, there are more “variations on the general theme” in Europe
than in the United States.
3) The United Kingdom may represent a special case, in terms of the issues that have been
previously presented, with characteristics that differentiate itself from both the United
States and continental Europe.
What do these ideas imply, regarding a potential answer to the previously posed “going
along for the ride” question? One provisional conclusion might be that Christians, from both
evangelical and non-evangelical traditions, who are drawn to “populist” causes are more likely to
choose a “right-wing” manifestation of this trend, primarily (but not exclusively) for cultural
reasons. In the United States, James Guth (2019, p. 32) has concluded that “the pervasive
populism of white Evangelical laity (as measured by the Populist Syndrome index) not only
helps explain their support for President Trump, but suggests powerful barriers to influence by
‘cosmopolitan internationalist’ Evangelical elites, who want to turn the community in a different
direction.” At the same time, Guth argues (2019, p. 30), as was referenced earlier, that economic
variables carry significantly less weight than non-economic factors. A complicating factor, when
it comes to these kind of determinations, is that certain issues, such as immigration and climate
disruption, contain a combination of economic and non-economic elements. Even considerations
of international trade, which might initially be regarded as being purely economic in nature, are
infused by cultural considerations, given the current trends towards nationalism, as well as the
association that is often made between trade controversies and political conflicts with certain
trading partners (read: China). The situation in Continental Europe represents even more
difficult challenges of discernment. The different populist factions in Europe are united by their
disdain for the European Union and what it represents, but not necessarily for the same reasons.

Some groups see the EU as an instrument of liberalization, especially with respect to economic
integration, while others view it as a means of centralization, particularly with regard to its
political institutions of pooled sovereignty. In recent years, these nations have also dealt with
additional issues that are particular to the European continent, such as the sovereign debt crisis
within the euro area and the subsequent implementation of “austerity” policies in return for
financial assistance. Trade, especially within the European single market, also does not carry
with it the same level of controversy that it does elsewhere.
This calendar year represents the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.
For most of this time period, a significant number of the world’s nations, especially since the end
of the Cold War 30 years ago, that increasingly embraced an approach to international
economics that emphasized the development of closer ties between countries; building bridges
instead of walls, if you will. The development of an institutional framework to facilitate these
networks was justified in both economic and political terms. The economic argument
maintained that although trade restrictions may benefit certain sectors of the economy in the short run,
they eventually reduce everyone's welfare, especially when they are met with retaliation. The political

argument held that the interest of each country is best served by cooperation with other nations,
especially those who share similar values, including active participation and leadership in multilateral institutions. The surge in “populist” sentiment, on both sides of the Atlantic, represents a
major challenge to these ideas. Before Christians, in any of these societies, jump on this
proverbial bandwagon with both feet, it might do well to consider the argument – not just
with respect to private acts of compassion, but in terms of public policy and institutions – that
the answer to the question from the Biblical account of the Good Samaritan - "Who is my
neighbor?" - should not be limited to members of one's own community or nation.
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